Hard or soft power? Greenland’s stance in the international scene
Greenland’s first official mention dates from 1053, as Pope Leo IX decided to commend the territory to Bishop Adalbert1. Its territory (2.1 km2) is equivalent to the size of New Guinea, Borneo and Madagascar reunited2, thus being the world’s largest island3. It is also the second-largest ice sheet4. The population is estimated at 56,000 inhabitants, mainly Inuit. The capital is Nuuk, with 17,600 inhabitants5. Internal and external transportation takes place by sea or air, as the country does not have a road system6.
Fig.1: Greenland in the world
Source: Wikimedia Commons
It is strategically located in the Arctic (500 miles from the North Pole) and the North American continent, between North America, Russia and Europe7. Thus, the island was an Allied bastion during World War II and during the Cold War8.
Its international significance9 is growing in the global fight against climate change, the increasing recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, and the exploitation of natural resources. As for those10, the region is notorious for its fisheries sector. Moreover, it gathers 10% of global freshwater. Greenland ranks as the 3rd world’s reserve in uranium, being also a potential key supplier for rare-earth metals.
These elements are so important for Greenland that controversy about mining rights created a political crisis in 2021. In December, the former Siumut government had presented the Kuannersuit Mineral project for thorium, uranium, and rare-earth elements mining11. Inuit opposition party threatened to boycott its application while the democrat party left the government, thus leading to the dissolution of the Parliament and to extraordinary polls in April 2021. The electoral process that followed was labelled as “Greenland’s Rare-Earth Election”12 by the international press; it produced a major political shift and voting saw a higher turnover than usual.
As Head of State, Denmark’s Queen, Margrethe II, and her government also rule over Greenland, where a High Commissioner represents them13. The Danish Parliament keeps two seats for Greenlandic members, occupied by the two largest parties in Greenland. Denmark is also Greenland’s principal supplier and trade partner14.
After a referendum in 2008, Greenland’s Home-Rule Act of 1979 was transformed into the more comprehensive Self-Rule, a legislation that allows for a large autonomy, despite the Executive role of the High Commissioner. Elected every four years, Greenland’s parliament counts on 31 members that work in 13 committees15. It chooses a Prime Minister, known as the Premier. The island has its government, the Naalakkersuisut, appointed by the Premier and composed, on average, of 10 members.
The territory displays several sovereignty symbols such as its hymn, flag, and post office16, and four representation missions abroad. Additionally, revenue from mineral resources belongs to Greenlandic authorities17. The island left the European Economic Community in 1985. In 2003, the Itilleq Declaration defined the possibilities for Greenland to act at the international level. Nowaday, Greenland’s foreign policy is based on the Danish Constitution, the Self-Rule Act, and custom practices18.
The Self-Rule Act also opens19 the door20 for a negotiated secession21 based on a: “explicit statement that the people of Greenland will decide on Greenland independence.”22Established already in 2017, a Constitutional Commission23 is currently discussing the possibilities for its political future, including free association with a third country.24
This paper will present the legal framework and Greenland’s steps towards more autonomy since the Cold War. After, it shall examine the island’s relationship with key countries such as the United States. The third part of this text will describe the regional position of Greenland in the Arctic, while the last will analyse its particular ties with the European Union. The conclusions will underline key features of Greenland’s paradiplomacy.
4.4.2. The legal framework: a long walk to autonomy
After the religious missions started in 1721, Greenland was recognised as a Danish colony in 181425, thus neither independent nor an equal part of Denmark. The Royal Greenlandic Trading Company was then entrusted with trade and general administration26, which lasted until the 20th century27.
The island acquired county status (“amt”) in 195328, thus becoming an official part of the realm with its representation at the parliament. Greenlanders were recognised as Danish citizens. This move stopped the possibility of having a decolonisation process29 before the United Nations. During the 50’s to 70’s period, Danish policies in this territory (described by Tomala as symbolic intimidation30) were received with what Olsen & Shadian31 defined as “severe social malaise,” as those regulations included the preference for the Danish language, the removal of several small communities (i.e., Qullissat in Disko island) and a compulsory study year in Denmark for Greenland teenagers.
Unrest drove to an autonomy referendum in 1978, followed by the approval of the Home Rule Act, which came into force in May 1979. This legislation32 created a government and a parliament for Greenland. Its rights over non-renewable resources were also recognised.
The situation evolved with the setting of the Self-Rule Act, approved by 75% in a referendum and effective as from 200933. This act allows34 Greenland to administrate internal matters35 (i.e., law enforcement, financial regulation and supervision, business and labour, aviation, immigration and border control, coast guard, education, health, fisheries, natural resources, safety, environment and climate36…) as well as to collect taxes and to define their custom rights. Official language switched from Danish to Greenlandic the same year.
Thirty-two competency domains were thus progressively handed over37 to Greenland’s government rule and budget. Greenland receives a block grant38 (the Bloktilskud, more than $600 million) from Denmark. It is equivalent to ¼ of its GDP and provides more than half of its finances. Control over surface and subsurface rights was conferred to Greenland in 2010. Consequently, the Danish grant might be diminished upon revenues resulting from these rights39. In this sense and following Norway’s model, Greenland intends to save a third of these incomes and create its own national fund to fill in for the Bloktilskud.
While Denmark retains its authority over core competencies such as currency, high courts, and defense, foreign policy is divided as described below.
On the one hand, the Danish Constitution grants the Denmark government the power to engage in international treaties and hold an international representation of the country. However, the Self-Rule legislation acknowledges Denmark and Greenland as equal partners while defining Kalaallit (Greenlanders) as a separate people40. Consequently, it enlists three main domains that define the international stance of Greenland: the criteria for its international involvement, subsoil rights, and some principles towards independence, such as a binding referendum. Therefore, Greenland is allowed to negotiate on its behalf in the areas covered by its jurisdiction41, even though the Danish government must be notified and informed of the progress of those negotiations42.
The rest of foreign and security affairs are generally kept under Danish exclusive rule, but for those of specific interest for Greenland, their participation in the negotiations43 is compulsory. The Greenlandic government must receive the draft of any agreement relating to its particular interests and have the possibility to comment on it44. Moreover, Greenlandic advisors can be appointed to Danish diplomatic missions following Greenland’s interests45. Uranium, for instance, is an example of this double directive46. While the resource exploitation falls on Greenland regulations, the security issues and the measures for respecting international treaties are defined by Denmark47. In 2016, four cooperation agreements48 were signed between Denmark and Greenland in this field. Those pacts solved the question of compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and EURATOM regulations.
Bilateral agreements (with an international dimension) between Greenland and the Faroe Islands are possible49 if they are exclusive and concerned with their jurisdiction. Greenland can request membership of international organisations, as far as (i) they are related to its competencies (ii) Denmark is not a member or (iii) they (also) accept non-state entities50. However, the Danish government should present the membership request on behalf of Greenland51. The island has its representation missions in Copenhagen, Reykjavik, Brussels, and Washington, other options that were being considered are Beijing or Moscow52.
4.4.3 Greenland and superpowers: the right side of the Force
As underlined by Olsen & Shadian53, the Artic attracts the attention of “powerful states.” In a Kissingerian approach, those authors speak about the “westphalisation” of the region, stressing the emerging interest of countries such as China or Japan. Gad54 also comments on the influence of the main five Arctic states (Russia, Canada, the US, Norway, and Denmark) and their requests to recognize their continental platform’s extent as grounds for acquiring the rights to unexploited natural resources. Kobza55 defines this concertation of the five countries as a “hegemonic stability.”
Between 2017 and 2020, the charismatic chair of COP15, Segolène Royal, was France’s ambassador for the Arctic and the Antarctic. In Greenland’s case, France has started a scientific and educational cooperation program known as Greenlandia56.
Several cooperation agreements were signed between Greenland (by Denmark) and Canada concerning cultural cooperation, environment and climate.57 Canada’s Inuit is related to Greenland’s, and the cooperation ties are also close58.
Escach59 stresses that “Americans and Chinese increase diplomatic visits, lobbying and in investment projects.” As explained by Meyer60, China was open to acquiring minerals from Greenland and proposed to include Greenland in its aid programme for global infrastructure, known as Belt and Road. Washington replied with an offer to invest, together with Denmark, in developing three airports on the island, thus equalling China’s offer.
Actually, the United States plays a major role in Greenland’s economy and development61. Consequently, Greenland opened a representation in Washington in September 2014. In a notorious decision62, the Trump administration tried to buy Greenland in April 2020, replying to Denmark’s refusal by sending a $12 million aid package to the island. This political move reminds us that Greenland was under US protection63 during World War II64.
While Nazis occupied inland Denmark65, in 1941, the official government (represented by Denmark’s ambassador) signed a defense agreement with Washington66. Greenland’s first airports, such as Narsarsuaq, were built at that time, while US coastguard vessels patrolled the island’s waters67.
After the war, in 1946, the US already proposed to buy the territory from Denmark. The result was the Thule agreement which authorised the US to install an airbase in Pituffik on NATO cooperation. Subsequently, the “Igaliku Agreements” in 2004 focused on economic, technical and environmental cooperation between the United States and Greenland68.
Hence, 2020 exchanges were a repetition that built a new agreement69 on the airbase. Still, this time there is a significant difference in Greenland’s role today, as the US reopened its consulate in Nuuk (closed since 1953)70 and signed directly with Greenland a “Common Plan for U.S.-Greenland Cooperation in Support of our Understanding.”
4.4.4. A regional approach of international relations: Arctic Strategies
The most well-known international forum in the Arctic is the Arctic Council71, created in 1996. It is an evolution of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy of 1991. A threefold representation (Greenland, Faroe Islands and Denmark) was kept for a long time before the Arctic Council. Indeed, Greenland’s premier signed the Ottawa Declaration, the document that created this organisation, on behalf of Denmark’s realm. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Olsen & Shadian72, there has been a progressive shift of power in this forum. Delegations do not always include subnational entities, and sometimes they do not even have a physical place at the table. So, in a fanciful paradox, the territories that justify the Arctic status of the member states are disregarded in the Arctic Council, and central national ministries absorb their representation. It is also clear that Greenland’s geographical location offers Denmark an international standpoint that does not correspond to the European size73.
Fig. 2: Arctic Map
Nevertheless, Greenland’s regional cooperation is not limited to the Arctic Council. Other fora allow the island to speak up for herself. For instance, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)74, created in 1977, represents the views of Inuit peoples at the international level. Subsequently, ICC has an observer status before the UN and permanent participant status before the Arctic Council75, holding full consultation rights in connection with the council’s negotiations and decisions. One of the main goals is to create a UN Permanent Forum for Inuit Peoplesinside the United Nations system. Inuit representation enhances Greenland’s voice at the international level on account of the prominence of peoples’ rights76.
As the Åland and the Faroe77, the island is an independent member of the Nordic Council, an intergovernmental organisation composed of 87 members of national parliaments. Greenland’s representation is composed of two delegates from its parliament. The organisation works on diverse matters such as disability, working life, legislation or energy, etc.
Similarly, the Arctic Circle78 defines itself as “the largest network of international dialogue and cooperation on the future of the Arctic and our Planet.” Its Assembly meets once a year, while other activities include the Arctic Circle Price or thematic forums. Moreover, this platform creates working groups (denominated mission councils). The Mission Council on Greenland in the Arctic79 was launched in June 2021. In October 202180, a special session was dedicated to the mandate of the Constitutional Commission of Greenland.
Additionally, the Arctic Frontiers81 annual Conference gathers academia with policymakers and business people, while its partners’ network links Arctic territories with actors worldwide. During the year, its secretariat organises events and projects around five main topics: Policy, Business, Science, Arena and Youth. The Arctic Economic Council82, the West Nordic Foundation and the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians83 can also be mentioned as an international sounding board.
4.4.5. The particular OCT status before the EU
Accession negotiations between Denmark and the European Communities included several transition clauses for Greenland, such as those for fisheries or some limitations to the freedom of movement. However, in 1972 Greenland rejected membership; the referendum results were negative in the island by 70%84. Despite this result, Greenland voting was counted with Denmark’s (63% in favour), so the territory joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 197385.
Denmark included an observer from Greenland in its Council delegation and a Greenlandic seat in the European Parliament; the territory was also eligible for European funding. However, the control of fisheries remained a major obstacle for full integration of Greenland in the EEC and a key discussion point inside the Home Rule Act.
Therefore, a referendum in 1982 allowed Greenland to leave the EU more than 30 years before the British plebiscite. Even if the vote was consultative, Denmark accepted it as a negotiating mandate and the territory left the EEC in 198586 to become an overseas country or territory87, except for its fishing industry88.
Exchanges are regulated by a Greenland-EU Partnership Agreement (FPA)89 in the fisheries sector. The initial package gave EC limited access to Greenland’s fisheries, while the island could perceive an amount of aid (“fish for cash”90) equivalent to their benefits under the European social fund programme, EUR 42.8 million annually91. This payment was at the time separated from the OCT package92. Current compensation is estimated at €20 million per year, while allowed catches have been reduced by 25%93.
Greenland, Denmark, and the EU revise these agreements every six years, known as fisheries protocols. The quotas on fisheries are renegotiated every year, and Greenland’s fisheries sector benefits from tax-free access to the EU for their products94.
The EU-Greenland Partnership strengthened the bilateral relationship in 200695 and 2021; so it is now included in the EU’s OCT decision96. Subsequently, as per the period 2021-2027, EU’s OCT aid for Greenland (European Development Fund) is estimated at €225 million, mainly focused on the educational system with a 10% addressed to green growth initiatives. Greenland’s envelope alone represents half of the whole OCT programme97.
This particular OCT standpoint, “sui generis remnants of the colonial era98,” recognises the primacy of Self-Rule over EU legislation99. Greenland is one of OCTA members, the association gathering the overseas territories of three European Union member countries (France, the Netherlands, and Denmark). Created in 2003, this group works as a cooperation and debate forum in the framework of the special relationship of these territories with the EU. OCTA members collaborate in diverse areas such as biodiversity, climate change, connectivity, education, energy, etc. Greenland was the chair in 2006 and 2012100.
Greenland has its representation before the EU101, currently managed by Inuuteq Holm Olsen, one of the authors consulted for this paper. The mission is located in the same building as the Danish Permanent Representation, the Royal Danish Embassy, and the Mission of the Faroes to the European Union. However102, Greenland has its entrance, flag, and symbols. Overall, the goal of this permanent mission, as said by its current Minister Counsellor, is to “disseminate outwards Greenlandic views and interests in the Arctic region and globally.”
The EU has been working on its Arctic strategy since the first EU Commission communication in 2008103. Beyond fisheries, Greenland can be seen as the best EU’s Artic card to play104because of three factors: (i) new shipping routes, (ii) exploitation of natural resources (iii) EU’s role in global questions such as climate change or peoples’ protection. Today, the European Union has an observer status before the Arctic Council, and several Directorates of the European Commission (MARE, JRC, MOVE…) participate in its working groups. EU’s Arctic policy is bound to be updated during 2021105.
Finally, it should be noted106 that Greenland joined the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA) in June 2021. This seed-money platform is co-funded by the European Union, and it “contributes to ensuring a reliable, secure and sustainable access to raw materials.” Greenland is represented at ERMA by its Ministry of Mineral Resources107.
4.4.6. Conclusions: balances, checks and some links
In Greenland’s case, Branka108 mentions that “the formation process of the island’s statehood exemplifies how the principle of self-determination of nations can be applied.” In this process, Greenland utilises paradiplomacy to assert and defend its interests such as self-determination, natural resources, investment, climate change, indigenous peoples’ recognition, developing regional relations… As we have seen, Greenland uses three main instruments: a shared foreign policy with Denmark (with significant independence on core matters), a growing activity in international, regional organisations, and the development of a specific status before (inside?) the European Union.
As Garcés de Los Fayos asserts: “Greenland already has, to a certain extent, a foreign policy of its own, although not conflicting with that of Denmark.” Nevertheless, increasing its international capacity comes with a paradox for Greenland: the need to rely on Denmark’s civil servants to further assume a true foreign policy109. As Achilles and the turtle, this can drive to a never-ending catch-up game where Denmark keeps its primacy over Greenland’s interests. The changes in Denmark’s delegation before the Arctic Council are a clear example of this paradox. Consequently, Greenland’s efforts to have its own foreign affairs staff are vital.
This assessment can be enlarged to the whole process of acquiring statehood. Whereas foreign affairs and international stance seem to progress, it is also necessary to ensure the internal development of the island110. Not only to reach independence at a potential moment in time but also to remain credible at the international level.
Secondly, the relation with the United States and, to a lesser degree, with other countries such as China or Canada provides Greenland with some leverage before Denmark to state its ground. Nevertheless, as Greenland’s foreign minister Ane Lone Bagger stated at the time: “We are open for business, but we’re not for sale.”111
EU’s move towards a more significant presence in the Arctic (where Greenland might serve as a lever) and US investment and physical presence in Greenland provide the island with different possibilities when examining the evolution towards a more state-like regime. Still, EEC membership in the seventies (and also US presence during the cold war) were major incentives for pushing towards Home Rule.
On the other hand, some experts warn about the environmental and social costs of mining investments112 thus, economic exchanges should include a comprehensive package (in the optics of Kissinger’s linkage). In general, Greenland acknowledges the importance of mining for its external relations, economic development, and political/social stability; the territory is not opposed to all mining but radioactive waste113. Finally, Tomala114 lists several countries interested in Greenland’s mining resources: China, Denmark, the USA, Canada, Australia, the UK, and the European Union. She also defines the island as “where the interests of great powers meet.”
Greenland is a very particular OCT, as it is politically sound, revenue is solid and its strategic stance and position make this territory a geopolitical issue both for Denmark and the EU. Accordingly, it also illustrates the EU’s limitations as a sovereign entity, as it could not replace, not even indirectly, Denmark’s support of Greenland.
Moreover, relations with the EU clearly show the implications of Self-Rule in Foreign Affairs, as Denmark and Greenland have completely different legal stances. This specific situation allows Greenland to hack the EU system, negotiating directly with the EU Commission and thus avoiding Danish intermediation. Nevertheless, due to the riven nature of its foreign policy, Greenland can also benefit from Denmark’s membership in the EU as a platform for its interests115. An extreme example of this was the EU ban on sealskins’ trade. Denmarks’ and Greenland’s lobby reached a halfway result, and the animal fur was prohibited unless it came from traditional hunters. Not only this exception shows how Denmark’s membership might contradict, potentially, Self-Rule, but also it could lead to a situation where the island would have been compelled to call out both the EU and Denmark before the WTO for a settlement116.
Greenland can also be perceived as an example of active subsidiarity from subnational entities, especially when dealing with the EU. As defined by Calamé117, active subsidiarity represents an independent action by a subnational government because “the levels of strategy formulation are varied and separate from the levels of daily management.” As Gad118 underlines, Greenland has played its cards wisely, avoiding antagonistic confrontation with Denmark and using the EU as a channel for being indirectly acknowledged as a stand-alone entity.
1 Tomala, M. (2017). The European Union’s Relations with Greenland. International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal, 20(1), 31–46. https://doi.org/10.1515/ipcj-2017-0015
2 Zellen, B. (2021). High Stakes in the High North: Alternative Models for Greenland’s Ongoing Constitutional and Political Transformation. Nordicum-Mediterraneum. Seen on December 2021, at https://nome.unak.is/wordpress/volume-16-no-2-2021/new-double-blind-peer-reviewed-article-volume-16-no-2-2021/high-stakes-in-the-high-north-alternative-models-for-greenlands-ongoing-constitutional-and-political-transformation/
3 Escach, N. (2019) « Nuuk : un modèle groenlandais de métropole arctique ? », Nordiques [En ligne], 37 | 2019, seen on December 7th 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/nordiques/432 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/nordiques.432
4 Garcés De Los Fayos, F. (2014, May). Greenland: The challenge of managing a key geostrategic territory (DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2014_16 PE 522.332). European Parliament. Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2014/522332/EXPO-AFET_SP(2014)522332_EN.pdf
5 Brańka, T. (2018). Greenland – from Autonomy to (In)Dependence. Przegląd Strategiczny, 11, 107–128. https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2018.1.8
6 Denmark – Other Areas in the Kingdom of Denmark. (n.d.). International Trade Administration | Trade.Gov. Retrieved December 8, 2021, from https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/denmark-other-areas-kingdom-denmark
7 See above
8 Ackrén, M., & Jakobsen, U. (2014). Greenland as a self-governing sub-national territory in international relations: past, current and future perspectives. Polar Record, 51(4), 404–412. https://doi.org/10.1017/s003224741400028x p. 412
9 Brańka, op.cit, p.107
10 Escach, op.cit.
11 Meyer, op.cit.
12 See above
13 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit., p. 6
14 Brańka, op.cit, p.120
15 Hofverberg, E. (2021, July 12). FALQs: Greenlandic Autonomy, Government Formation, and Mineral Resource Policy | In Custodia Legis: Law Librarians of Congress. Library of Congress Blog. Retrieved December 8, 2021, from https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2021/07/falqs-greenlandic-autonomy-government-formation-and-mineral-resource-policy/
16 Brańka, op.cit, p.109
17 Brańka, op.cit, p.121
18 The Legal Frameworks – Naalakkersuisut. (n.d.). The Government of Greenland (1). Retrieved December 8, 2021, from https://naalakkersuisut.gl//en/Naalakkersuisut/Departments/Udenrigsanliggende/Naalakkersuisuts-udenrigspolitiske-kompetencer/De-juridiske-rammer
19 Zellen, op.cit.;
20 Naalakkersuisut The Government of Greenland (2). Retrieved December 7th 2021, from https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About-Greenland/Politics-in-Greenland
21 Escach, op.cit.;
22 Brańka, op.cit, p.112
23 https://ina.gl/udvalg/lovpligtige-og-staaende-udvalg/forfatningskommissionen/?lang=en
24 Work on Greenland’s Constitution drafting restarts. (2020, May 21). Nationalia. Retrieved December 11, 2021, from https://www.nationalia.info/brief/11313/work-on-greenlands-constitution-drafting-resumes
25 Garcés De Los Fayos, op.cit., p. 5
26 Gad, U. P. (2014). Greenland: A post-Danish sovereign nation state in the making. Cooperation and Conflict, 49(1), 98–118. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836713514151, 101-102 ;
27 Hovgaard, G., & Ackrén, M. (2017). Autonomy in Denmark: Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Coleccion Monografias CIDOB 2017, Secession and Counter-secession, 69‑76. https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/monografias/secession_and_counter_secession/autonomy_in_denmark_greenland_and_the_faroe_islands p. 73
28 Hovgaard & Ackrén, , op.cit., p. 70
29 Tomala, op.cit, p. 36
30 See above
31 Olsen & Shadian, op.cit., p. 236
32 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit., p. 5
33 Olsen & Shadian, op.cit., p. 237
34 Hovgaard & Ackrén, op.cit., p. 70
35 Naalakkersuisut (1), op.cit.
36 International Trade Administration, op.cit.
37 Escach (2019), op.cit.
38 Hovgaard & Ackrén, op.cit., p.74
39 Meyer, R. (2021, May 4). Greenland’s Rare-Earth Election. The Atlantic. Retrieved December 8, 2021, from https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2021/05/greenlands-rare-earth-election/618785/
40 Hovgaard & Ackrén, , op.cit., p. 70
41 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit., p.6
42 Brańka, op.cit, p.112-113
43 Naalakkersuisut (2), op.cit.
44 Brańka, op.cit, p.113
45 See above
46 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit., p.16
47 Olsen & Shadian, op.cit., p. 238
48 Brańka, op.cit, p.124
49 Naalakkersuisut (2), op.cit.
50 See above.
51 Brańka, op.cit, p.113
52 Garcés de los Fayos, p.6
53 Olsen & Shadian, op.cit., p.229
54 Gad, op.cit, p.109
55 Kobza, op.cit., p. 133
56 https://greenlandia.org/
57 Kobza,op.cit, pp. 148-149
58 Zellen, op.cit.
59 Escach, op.cit.
60 Op.cit.
61 Kobza, op.cit., p.149
62 Finnegan, C. (2020, 26 avril). After Trump tried to buy Greenland, US gives island $12M for economic development. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-buy-greenland-us-island-12m-economic-development/story?id=70305163
63 Hovgaard & Ackrén, op.cit., p. 73 ;
64 Zellen, op.cit.
65 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit, p.12
66 Gad, op.cit. p.107
67 Ackrén §Jakobsen, op.cit, p.2
68 Kobza, op.cit, p. 148
69 Humpert, M. (2020, October 30). Greenland and U.S. Agree On Improved Cooperation at Thule Air Base. High North News. Retrieved December 6, 2021, from https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/greenland-and-us-agree-improved-cooperation-thule-air-base
70 Zellen, op.cit.
71 Olsen Shadian, op.cit., p.238-239
72 Olsen & Shadian, op.cit., p.234
73 Brańka, op.cit, p.120
74 https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/
75 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit., p. 11
76 Kobza, op.cit. , p.133
77 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit., p. 10
78 https://www.arcticcircle.org/about
79 https://www.arcticcircle.org/virtual/greenland-in-the-arctic
80 Olsvig, S. [@SaraOlsvig]. (2021, October 14). Sara Olsvig on the work of the Constitutional Commission of Greenland [Announcement]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/SaraOlsvig/status/1448602788544589831
81 https://www.arcticfrontiers.com/about-the-conference/
82 https://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/
83 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit.,p. 11
84 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit., p.20
85 Olsen & Shadian, op.cit., pp. 236-237
86 Kobza, op.cit., p. 135
87 Olsen & Shadian, op.cit., p. 237
88 Hofverberg, E. (2019, June 21). Greenland’s National Day, the Home Rule Act (1979), and the Act on Self-Government (2009) | In Custodia Legis: Law Librarians of Congress. Library of the Congress Blog. Retrieved December 8, 2021, from https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2019/06/greenlands-national-day-the-home-rule-act-1979-and-the-act-on-self-government-2009/
89 See above
90 Kobza, op.cit., p.136
91 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit., p. 20
92 Kobza, op.cit., p.138
93 McGwin, K. (2021a, January 12). The EU will pay more to fish less in Greenland waters. ArcticToday. Retrieved December 10, 2021, from https://www.arctictoday.com/the-eu-will-pay-more-to-fish-less-in-greenland-waters/
94 Tomala, op.cit, p.38
95 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit, p. 4
96 The Decision on the Overseas Countries and Territories including Greenland- 2021–2027 (Previously the Partnership Agreement) – Naalakkersuisut. (n.d.). Naalakkersuisut (3). Retrieved December 11, 2021, from https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/Greenland-Representation-to-the-EU/European-Union-and-Greenland/Partnership-Agreement
97 McGwin, K. (2021, October 8). Greenland is set to receive half of EU funding for ‘overseas strategic outposts.’ ArcticToday. Retrieved December 10, 2021, from https://www.arctictoday.com/greenland-to-receive-half-of-eu-funding-for-overseas-strategic-outposts/
98 Kobza,op.cit., p.132
99 Kobza, op.cit., p.135
100 Garcés de los Fayos, op.cit., p.20
101 Greenland Representation to the EU – Naalakkersuisut. (n.d.). Naalakkersuisut The Greenland Government (3). Retrieved December 8, 2021, from https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/Greenland-Representation-to-the-EU
102 Gad, op.cit., p. 116
103 Kobza, op.cit, p.131 et p.133
104 Tomala, op.cit., pp.33-34
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106 Hofverberg (2021), op.cit.
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