

# The World Demographically Is Similar To Europe: Problematic and Challenges

*Salam AL Rabadi*

*University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain.*

**ABSTRACT:** There is a new global demographic pattern (reverse change), in which many countries around the world will suffer from a demographic reality similar to that of Europe or perhaps worse than it, which will become a future global challenge and will have decisive strategic implications that are related to issues of migration, aging and demographic dividend, not to mention demographic data religious. Accordingly, in our article we will shed light on several strategic issues related to the impact of the new global demographic pattern on the future of Europe. Especially in light of the dependence of many European countries mainly on increasing the number of immigrants from developing countries in order to address the demographic dilemma, at a time when those countries will suffer with the same demographic problem in the future. Inevitably, this reality will raise serious questions about the available European options and alternatives to confront these changes and challenges, especially at the level of the dialectical relationship between demographic growth, the welfare state, sustainable development, and the problematics of terrorism.

**Keywords:** Europe, Demography, Aging, Africa, Religion, Security, Immigration, politics.

## *O mundo é demograficamente semellante a Europa: problemas e desafíos*

**RESUMO:** Existe un novo patrón demográfico global (cambio inverso), no que moitos países do mundo sufrirán unha realidade demográfica similar á de Europa ou quizais peor. Este patrón demográfico converterase nun reto global de futuro e terá implicacións estratéxicas decisivas que estarán relacionados con temas como as migracións, o avellentamento e o dividendo demográfico, sen esquecer os datos demográficos relixiosos. En consecuencia, co noso artigo trataremos de aportar luz sobre varias cuestións estratéxicas relacionadas co impacto do novo patrón demográfico global no futuro de Europa. Sobre todo tendo en conta a dependencia de moitos países europeos do aumento do número de inmigrantes procedentes de países en vías de desenvolvemento para afrontar o dilema demográfico, nun momento no que eses países sufrirán o mesmo problema demográfico. Inevitablemente, esta realidade suscitará serias preguntas sobre as opcións e alternativas europeas dispoñibles para afrontar estes cambios e desafíos, en particular a respecto da relación entre o crecemento demográfico, o estado do benestar, o desenvolvemento sostible e a problemática do terrorismo.

**Palabras clave:** Europa, Demografía, Avellentamento, África, Relixión, Seguridade, Inmigración, política.

### ***El mundo es demográficamente semejante a Europa: problemas y desafíos***

**RESUMEN:** Existe un nuevo patrón demográfico global (cambio inverso), en el que muchos países de todo el mundo sufrirán una realidad demográfica similar a la de Europa o quizás peor que ella, lo que se convertirá en un futuro reto global y tendrá implicaciones estratégicas decisivas que están relacionadas con cuestiones de migración, envejecimiento y dividendo demográfico, por no hablar de los datos demográficos religiosos. En consecuencia, en nuestro artículo arrojaremos luz sobre varias cuestiones estratégicas relacionadas con el impacto del nuevo patrón demográfico mundial sobre el futuro de Europa. Especialmente a la luz de la dependencia de muchos países europeos principalmente del aumento del número de inmigrantes procedentes de países en vías de desarrollo para hacer frente al dilema demográfico, en un momento en el que esos países sufrirán con el mismo problema demográfico en el futuro. Inevitablemente, esta realidad planteará serios interrogantes sobre las opciones y alternativas europeas disponibles para afrontar estos cambios y desafíos, especialmente a nivel de la relación dialéctica entre el crecimiento demográfico, el estado de bienestar, el desarrollo sostenible y la problemática del terrorismo.

**Palabras clave:** Europa, Demografía, Envejecimiento, África, Religión, Seguridad, Inmigración, política.

## **1. Introduction**

---

According to the data and statistics of many global reports, there are new global demographic patterns, based on the fact that the fertility decline, aging rate rises, will not only be monopolized in Europe, but will also include all parts of the world, which may be more severe than in Europe (NIA,2021, Dramani,2022).

Therefore, in line with current and projected future demographic patterns, and in the context of stressing the global nature of changes in demographics, immigration and demographic dividend, not to mention religious demographic growth that affect European countries and developing countries alike (DESA, 2021;Cilluffo & Ruiz,2019), it is necessary to ask many crucial and fateful questions, that revolve around:

- » *How can Europe rely solely on a vision or policies based on increasing the number of immigrants from developing countries at a time when those countries will suffer from the same demographic problem in the future?*
- » *To what extent can European countries adopt strategies capable of confronting the economic, cultural and political impacts of all these profound global demographic shifts and challenges?(Snel & Cremer,2020; Formosa ,2019).*

## **2. European Demographic Momentum**

---

In effect, the momentum for population growth in Europe has flipped from positive to negative, and the trend could strongly influence population numbers throughout the coming decades. During the 21st century, the European Union has entered the stage of very slow demo-

graphic growth, not to mention the increase in the rate of aging(Walker,2019). *It is clear that population growth in Europe has reached a fateful turning point at all levels, including labor, markets, family structures, intergenerational relations, and military service(Herrmann,2022).*

Where, in the coming decades, many countries in Europe are likely to face financial, political, and security pressures related to health care systems and policies, pensions, and social protection for an increasing number of older people(Rabadi,2023). Not to mention the real risks associated with securing human resources in the military sectors. So, logically the prospects and consequences of the future demographic situation are widely discussed across Europe(Ertürk. & Karaçizmeli,2022).

## 2.1. Demographic Extremism

There are 3 major trends to shape Europe's population: longevity, a declining number of children and increasing numbers of migrants. Hence, Europe combines demographic "extremes": *Many parts of Europe experience the lowest fertility ever recorded in human history, at the same time, many European Union countries have the highest life expectancy in the world(Eurostat,2023).*

For example, life expectancy at birth in Spain, Switzerland and Germany is 83 years, Britain, Austria and Norway 81 years, Sweden and Italy 82 years, Denmark & Belgium 80 years, Ukraine 73 years, Bulgaria 74 years, Poland 77 years (Eurostat, 2021;DG ECFIN,2018; Eurostat,2023a). As a result of all this data, Europe's population is aging: In 2022, older people (aged 65 or over) had a 21.1 % share (more of 0.3 percentage points (pp) compared with the previous year and an increase of 3.1pp compared with 10 years earlier), not to mention the age group 0-15 is already shrinking(Eurostat,2023b).

Accordingly, population aging is poised to become one of the most significant social transformations in Europe which will have strategic implications in the future, with implications for nearly all sectors of society(Rabadi,2022; Ertürk,et al.,2022a ). Subsequently, Europe faces declining working age populations and the prospect of declining native labor forces. *These changes will affect the future of the EU, and lead to a number of challenges, which are likely to be of major significance in the coming decades, which can be formulated through the following questions:*

- » 1. How to encourage sustainable economic growth during a period when the number and proportion of working-age people will decline?
- » 2. *How to safeguard social welfare model with increasing rate of aging?*
- » 3. *How to deal with pace of population growth, where probably, momentum of demographic decline will remain constant, even if a new generation of women has a higher fertility rate than their mothers do?(Bricker & Ibbitson,2019;Münz,2007).*

## 2.2. Key Data

In 2020, the population of the European Union with 27 Member States was estimated at 447.7 million, down by 12.8% as compared with 513.5 million in 28 Member States in 2019, most certainly this decrease was a result of the UK's withdrawal. Also, the populace of the EU changed into anticipated at nearly 513 million in 2019, in comparison with 512 million in 2018.

*But, in general, the total population change was positive, as the population increased by 0.9 million people during 2019, as a result of the net migration rate (Eurostat, 2020).*

But after interruption of population growth (2020- 2021) due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the population of the European Union at 27 countries increased again in 2022, from 446.7 million in 2022 to 448.4 million in 2023. Where growth is largely attributed to the increase in migratory movements post-Covid-19 and to the mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine in 2022 (Eurostat, 2023c).

*Germany is the maximum populated EU Member State with 83 million citizens (or 16%) of the overall EU populace (DG ECFIN, 2018a). France with 64 million (13.1%), Italy with 60.4 million (11.8%), Spain with 46.9 million (9%) and Poland with 38 million "7.4%" (Eurostat, 2023d). Overall, 16 EU Member States at the moment are projected to have better fertility rates in 2060 (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (Eurostat, 2019).*

However, fertility rates in almost all countries are expected to remain below the natural replacement rate of 2.1 with inside the duration to 2070. *Here at the methodological level we must be careful when we want to read projections associated with increasing the fertility rate, because migration from Eastern Europe is responsible for part of the increase of fertility across Europe, not as result of rate of increased fertility to original Europeans (Eurostat, 2023e).*

In this context, low fertility and increasing life expectancy both, during the last decades, reversed the age structure in Europe, leading to a shrinking number of younger people, to an aging and eventually shrinking work force. Hence, such an age structure can not be defined as a "Pyramid" because the gravity has shifted from the younger to the older people. This trend generally is called demographic getting older "Demographic Aging" (Eatock, et al., 2019; Eurostat, 2017).

*But opposite to many predictions of demographic decline, there are those who believe and predict a different future at the European demographic level. Based on the following idea: A population decline in Europe isn't assured, but the decline in the number of future parents is a reality which could set in movement a drop in population. That is going to push the population toward decline (Cristea, et al., 2020). Here the following future problematic must be raised:*

Will Europe eventually enter an era of inevitable demographic decline? Or will policies to increase the rate of immigration to Europe have positive results in this regard?

There are some opinions and theories based on the idea that European population won't decline if migration is high enough to offset this population momentum. *It should be noted that while declining fertility and growing longevity are the key drivers of population aging, migration has additionally contributed to converting or changing population age structures (Marois, et al., 2020).*

Where, in countries with more frequent flows of international migration, immigration in this case can therefore slow down the aging process somewhat (at least temporarily), because migrants in general tend to be of young working age. However, those immigrants who remain in the country will eventually age. *In general, it seems that the issue of immigration will remain one of the most controversial topics, whether at the economic or political level in Europe (DG ECFIN, 2018b).*

### 2.3. Low Fertility and Global Demographic Pattern

At the global level, projections indicate the possibility of the EU's population rising to 528.5 million in 2040, before declining to 520 million in 2070 (UNFPA, 2023). In this context, the share of the current EU Member States in the world population fell from 13.5% in 1960 to 6.9% in 2015. The EU's share of the total world population is therefore forecast to shrink to 4.5% in 2070 (Eurostat, 2019a).

Looking at the age structure, it can be seen that in comparison to other large countries, the EU had the second highest old-age dependency ratio in 2015 (29.2%), after Japan (42.7%). This ratio is forecast to rise in the EU by 25%. By 2070, reaching 54.2%—still second-highest ratio amongst large countries (Eurostat, 2021a). Hence, by 2100, the share of working-age people in the EU's total population is projected to decrease from 65% in 2018 to 55% in 2100 (Eurostat, 2019b).

The only large countries forecast to see a larger rise in the very old-age dependency ratio between 2015-2070 than that in the EU are Japan and China (DG ECFIN, 2018c; DG ECFIN, 2018d). *To sum up, the overall picture is clear, Europe's demographic situation is characterized by low fertility, an increasing life expectancy, and projected shrinking of native populations in the decades to come.*

According to population projections published by EU, total population in EU27 will continue to increase until 2025 at a reduced pace. Also, it expects a subsequent decline to 472 million in 2050, with all new and many old the EU member states facing a marked decrease of native populations (DG ECFIN, 2018e).

*In the global context, the world population share of EU Member States declined, and will continue to decline in the future.* Data shows that the world population share of EU Member States declined from 13.5% in 1960 to 6.9% in 2015. The share of the EU is projected to drop to 4.5% by 2070, despite the projected net migration inflows (PRB, 2019).

*Moreover, by examining the demographic details across the globe, we can truly know that there is a new global demographic pattern (Reverse change), Will affect all countries of the world, and it will have very serious implications for the future of the European continent. Where statistical analyzes show that the worldwide population explosion of the 20th century has turned into the population implosion of the 21st century, and worldwide fertility is falling (Marx, 2015).*

*Hence, the world is like Europe, where low fertility will not only be on the European continent, but will also generally encompass all around the world (Herrmann, 2022).*

Where, the global fertility rate, which fell from 3.2 in 1990 to 2.5 in 2019, is projected to decline further to 2.2 in 2050. In 2019, fertility rates were still above the normal replacement rate (2.1 births per woman, on average, over a lifetime) in Africa: sub-Saharan (4.6), Northern Africa and Western Asia (2.9). Also, in Central and Southern Asia (2.4), and Oceania region excluding Australia/New Zealand: 3.4 (DESA, 2019).

In this context, the UN reports expect the global population growth to slow significantly. The period of rapid growth occurred during the years from 1975 to 2011, taking only 12 years to grow by a billion. Currently, the world has passed this peak growth rate, and thus the period between each billion is expected to continue to rise. As it is expected that this process, in order

to reach eight billion people in 2024, will require approximately 13 years; On the other hand, in order to reach 9 billion in the year 2038, it is expected that another 14 years will be required. Also, in order to reach 10 billion in the year 2056; expected to take over 18 years (Roser, et al., 2019; UNFPA, 2023).

### 3. Adverse Global Changes

There are reverse demographic shifts, as the trend that is expected to control demographic changes in the future is based on population growth which is generally slowing in all cultures worldwide.

#### 3.1. Catch Up With Europe

In order to compensate for the demographic shortfall, procreation rates must match the replacement rates. In this context, Europe has serious demographic problematics as a result of the population number remaining constant. *No European country might currently have a fertility rate equal to its replacement rate, but many other countries are starting to catch up with Europe. According to UN projection, now country after country is moving into a world in which the population is stagnant because of low fertility* (Desjardins, 2021; PRB, 2019a).

For example, the populations of Turkey and Central Asia are much younger, but in coming decades they may age even faster than European countries did in previous decades. Indeed, in more than half the countries in Central Asia the population is already shrinking (RFE/RL's, 2021; Bussolo, et al., 2015).

*Therefore, fertility rate in developing countries is expected to decline from 2.7 to 2.2 by 2050* (ILO, 2013; DESA, 2015).

It is also expected that the total population of 38 countries in 2050 will be less than it was in 2018. It is expected that China will record the largest (numerical) decrease in the population of nearly 50 million people, followed by Japan with nearly 25 million, And then Russia, with nearly 9.4 million. In this context, Romania will witness the largest decline in population, by 23% (Bricker & Ibbitson, 2019a; Vollset, et al., 2020).

The largest gathering of populations (below replacement level) is in East Asia, also the largest demographic communities (below replacement level) in China. The global decline in fertility will also be accompanied by a decline in the proportion of young people in most countries of the world. The world youth population (ages 15 to 24) is projected to rise to 1.4 billion in 2050 (UNDP, 2014).

But the youth share of world population will fall to 14% from 16%, with the largest drop in East Asia and the Pacific (from 17.3% in 2010 to 10.7% in 2050). And the regions with the highest shares of young people in their population are Sub-Saharan Africa (20.2%). Also, the share of young people in the total population is expected to fall in most regions by 2050 (UNDP, 2018; Herrmann, 2022).

This future reality will require assuming great political and economic responsibilities, governments in those regions, in cooperation with the international community, must work to seriously confront these challenges. This is in order to ensure the provision of job opportunities

for young people, otherwise increased unemployment will lead to facing social and political unrest that will have an impact beyond the political reality within those areas (Rabadi, 2022a).

### 3.2. The Dramatic Shift in the Demographic Balance

There is a dramatic shift in the demographic balance between the more developed and less developed countries, where growth is expected to occur over the next 40 years in developing countries, and half of the increase will be produced between 2015 and 2050 (DESA, 2019a). *Different demographic changes have also taken place in a remarkable speed.* For example, only few experts had questioned the idea of China's population superiority over the next decades, but current statistics confirm the end of China's demographic dominance, for India to become the largest country in terms of population over the next decade (Chaurasia, 2019; DESA, 2019b).

Projections from the United Nations indicate that by 2024, India will overtake China to become the world's most populous country. Keeping in mind, expectations are always associated with a degree of uncertainty and this means that there is a margin of variance and therefore may be a few years ago or after. *In this context, these changes will certainly bring many future demographic dilemmas to India* (Eggleston, 2017).

And if current global demographic trends continue until 2050, it will lead to overpopulation and urban overcrowding, and most of this growth will occur in developing countries (It's estimated that three countries will combine for 35% of all urban population growth India 17%, China 10%. And Nigeria 8%). This means that poor countries will have to build the equivalent of a new city containing more than one million people every week over the next 40 years (Desjardins, 2019).

This reality will have implications on the potential opportunities of designing, building, operating and maintaining these new cities in a better way (Ross, 2019); a major controversial global challenge and risk at the levels of:

- » 1. Challenges of global food security. If there is no surge in urban agriculture, every rural woman will have to shift from providing food for herself and one of the urban dwellers (as today) to providing food for herself and two by 2050. Knowing that most of the world's agricultural workers are women (UNFPA, 2019; FAO, 2018).
- » 2. Dialectic future relationship between demographic growth and climate change which the European continent gives the greatest attention to. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the population is likely to double by 2060, to around 2.2 billion people. With stalled social development and a lack of expansion of schooling, this could even rise to 2.7 billion. This in turn would lead to widespread poverty and high vulnerability to climate change with serious implications for potential emigration (Lutz, et al., 2018; Moran, 2017).

## 4. Age Structure and Demographic Dividend

Several countries around the world will suffer from reality similar to Europe or perhaps even worse in terms of rising aging rate which will become a future global challenge (Rabadi, 2023a). *In this context, in 2020, there were 727 million people aged 65 or over in the world, and over the next three decades the number is expected to double to more than*

1.5 billion (in 2050). Where all countries and continents will witness an increase in the rate of aging, and thus the proportion will rise from 9.3% in 2020 to approximately 16% in 2050 (Jing, et al., 2019; DESA, 2020; DESA, 2015a).

#### 4.1. Problematic of Demographic Dividend

The age structure will change drastically at accelerated rates and will have critical strategic implications, including the problematics associated with *The Demographic Dividend*. Which means that the economic growth that may result from changes to a country's age structure. This means that the workforce will grow faster than the number of people who depend on it, creating and opening ample window for the possibility of faster economic growth, and the resulting higher family welfare (Bacci, 2017).

For example, one of the dilemmas which China will face in the future is the rapid transition from being a young country to an aging country. This means that China is might be aging before becoming a rich country (Jing, et al., 2019a). *A commonly used indicator for the speed of population aging is the number of years for a country's population aged 65 and over to double from 7% of the total population to 14%*. In this context, the often took France as a model that can be measured against, that it took 115 years for its share of older population to achieve this doubling (Ogawa, 2021).

Also, the important examples that can be mentioned, that many European countries have needed or waited nearly half a century or more to achieve this doubling. For example, it took Sweden 85 years. In North America, specifically in the United States, that doubling took about 70 years. And in Australia, doubling took about 73 years (Kiss, et al., 2020). On the other hand, it seems that Japan was the exception among the more developed countries, it took Japan only 25 years (1970 to 1995) to have its older population double from 7% to 14% of its total population (Sokolovsky, 2020).

*Thus, it can be said, while most of the more developed countries have already completed this doubling, developing countries (especially those in Latin America and Asia) have started to march in this direction, but appear to be moving much faster more than the developed countries used to do* (Berganza, et al., 2020). *It has become very clear that aging is progressing faster still in developing countries* (He, et al., 2016; Dossa, et al., 2017). For example, in 8 of developing countries, the share of the elderly population is projected to reach 14% in 30 years or less: Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Turkey and Thailand (UNDP, 2013; UNDP, 2018a).

Consequently, the fact that this doubling may take only two decades in many Asian and Latin American countries *will raise serious and strategic concerns regarding how these countries will prepare to deal with the spread of the phenomenon of aging in society at a tremendous speed, not to mention the problematic of how to face the challenges resulting from it* (Chen, 2016; DoD, 2016).

#### 4.2. Strategic Questions

There are strategic and very important implications for everything related to population aging rates, as most developing countries are still poor despite the demographic transition. Con-



sequently, many of these countries will struggle to try to meet the growing needs of the older population. Many developing countries have only a brief window of opportunity to reap the full benefits of the demographic dividend of a larger working-age population (Rahman, et al., 2021).

Therefore, *this reality emphasizes the importance of creating an enabling political environment in order to benefit from the demographic dividend. This requires finding strategies based on policies and programs that guide the path of demographic transition in developing countries* (Dramani, et al., 2023).

For example, many countries (especially sub-Saharan Africa) are trying to focus on increasing job opportunities, reducing unemployment, or securing a productive job market, but all these efforts remain incomplete unless they are accompanied by real and effective investments on the levels: governance, education, health and women's empowerment (Cardona, et al., 2020). Accordingly, and under the indicators confirming the unprecedented increase in the rate of aging, there are many strategic questions related to the following:

- » 1. *To what extent can develop countries benefit (to the maximum extent possible) of the demographic dividend while increasing population and aging growth* (ADB, 2019)?
- » 2. *What is the impact of the new demographic pattern (global aging) on the future of Europe?*

Consequently, if the actual necessary investments are not made (in terms of education, health and employment...etc.) in order to enhance potential economic opportunities and reap demographic dividends (Sewamala, 2015).

*This rapid demographic growth at the level of aging could have serious negative effects on all levels, whether on developing countries or on European countries in particular* (ILO, 2019). In this context, it should be taken into account that there is a significant impact of demographic pressures related to high fertility rates or the rapid increase in the growth of aging phenomenon in developing countries on the level of terms of high social demand, unemployment, persistent poverty, political instability and cultural and religious tensions (PRB, 2017).

In light of the above, *it becomes strategically important to ask about the repercussions of this unstable social and economic and cultural situation in developing countries with explosive demographic growth (especially in Africa) on European security* (Traore, 2019; Wolff, 2021). Thus, we must analyze the mechanism of the interrelationship between social, economic and cultural factors (including religious demographic growth) in a multidimensional approach.

## 5. Religious Demography And Geo-Cultural Dimensions

The importance of approaching the future dimensions of religious demographic trends stems from the increasingly entrenched belief that the twentieth century was the century of secularism, and that the twenty-first century will be marked by a return to religion. *As the religious composition of the population will remain one of the most important factors affecting the cultural homogeneity and political cohesion of societies* (Grim, 2018; Ward, 2019). As the increasing religious diversity within countries may lead to the formation of more divided and less stable societies, not to mention the weakening of the collective national identity bond..

etc. Based on this, it can be said that the effects of religious demographic changes will inevitably have an important role and influence in shaping and determining the future of Europe in particular (GRF, 2022).

### 5.1. Religious Revolution and African Demographic Growth

Given significance for the European future, the demographic reality and its religious implications in the African continent should be addressed, as it is expected that Africa's population will increase significantly (Roser, et al., 2019a). Africa will more than double by 2050 and account for 58% of the global population increase. Furthermore, the rate of population growth remains high in the group of 47 countries designated by the UN least developed, including 32 countries in sub-Saharan Africa (DESA, 2019c).

*So, where, as is population growth rate in Africa will be about 10 times higher than in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as 15 times higher than the growth rate in Asia.* Where, the overall share of Asia is expected to decline although it will remain largely the most populous continent with 49.1% of the world population in 2070 (The decline is particularly evident for China, whose world population share is projected to fall from 18.9% to 11.4% between 2015 and 2070). Currently, Asia has a population of about 4.6 billion, and by 2050 it is expected that this number will increase to 5.3 billion. However, it is expected to decline thereafter, in the latter half of this century (DG ECFIN, 2018f).

And also for example, *in 2050 Nigeria is likely to take the place of the US as the third-largest country in the world in terms of population*, which will have very significant security and political implications in societies of multicultural, racial or religious diversity. So, it must be taken into account that this future Nigerian demographic reality has very important strategic implications. Where Nigeria is the strategic depth of Africa, as it contains nearly 20% of the population of Africa (sub-Saharan), not to mention being the largest producer of oil and natural gas on the continent, in addition to having the largest economy in Africa (Campbell & Page, 2018).

However, Nigeria still suffers from problems that prevent it from achieving its global status and influence that matches its actual potential. *One of those problematics, for example, is the presence of the "Boko Haram" organization, which represents Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, which is concentrated in the northeast of the country, and represents a strategic security challenge* (Offodile, 2016). Also, among those problematics are the ongoing unrest in the Niger Delta. Moreover, there are ongoing conflicts resulting from the cultural map of Nigeria, as it is a country that is roughly half Christian and half Muslim (Fagbule & Fawehinmi, 2021; Campbell & Page, 2018a; Offodile, 2016).

*Based on this, it can be said that one of the striking signs of African demographic growth is a major religious revolution, which will be felt by the Christian religion.* With the decline of the proportion of Christians in Europe, but in contrast, in 2025, the number of Christians in sub-Saharan Africa will increase to reach approximately 640 million. In addition, sub-Saharan Africa's Christian population is expected to double, to 1.1 billion in 2050. The share of the world's Christians living in sub-Saharan Africa will rise from 24% in 2010 to 38% in 2050 (Wormald, 2015).

## 5.2. The Normative Value and Christian-rooted Europe

It is almost certain that most of the Christians of the world will live in Africa (Four out of every 10 Christians in the world will live in sub-Saharan Africa) by 2050. In this context, Europe may be the only region in the world where the total population is projected to decline. Hence, on the level of religious demographic analysis, it is expected that the Christian population in Europe will shrink by about 100 million in the coming decades, as it is expected dropping from 553 million to 454 million (Murray, 2018).

So, while Christians will remain the largest religious group in Europe, they are projected to drop from three-quarters of the population to less than two-thirds. As well, it is expected that by 2050 nearly a quarter of Europeans (23%) will have no any religious affiliation. In contrast, the number of Muslims at that time will reach about 10% of the European continent's population compared to 5.9% in 2010 (Wormald, 2015a). Accordingly, and based on the projections of the Kenyan thinker" John Mbiti", *it seems that the centers of Christian religious weight will not exist in Christian-rooted Europe (Rome, Athens, Paris, and London) but will move to Addis Ababa, Kinshasa and Buenos Aires (Mbiti, 2015; Wormald, 2015b).*

This clearly shows the significance of the implications of religious and demographic growth in Africa, in terms of geographical, cultural and security dimensions, on Europe, especially at the level :

- » 1. The normative value of the European continent with Christian roots. It cannot be overlooked to consider the importance and role of the religious demographic dimension in consolidating social cohesion or creating a European identity, not to mention the normative value of Europe globally. Indeed, many of the questions that have accompanied (and are still) related to discussions about whether to refer in the current (or perhaps future) European constitution to the Christian roots of Europe may have implications that extend beyond the scope of religion itself, as they fall into The core issues inherent in the European cultural and political integration project, Whether on the internal level of the continent or at the level of the stature, value and role of European influence globally (Sládek, 2019).
- » 2. The dialectical relationship between demographic growth, sustainable development and the problematic of terrorism. In this context, it is worth noting, the world's poorest countries are also the most populous (Congo, Uganda, Niger, Liberia, Mali, Chad). Which raises many difficulties related to how sustainable development can be achieved (Lewis, 2018; Wormald, 2015c). Not to mention the rationale for the link between poverty, terrorism and religious fundamentalisms. For example, sub-Saharan Africa is expected to be the center of Islam, that is, the number of Muslims in Asia is equal to the number of Muslims in the Middle East (UNDP, 2018b; Smythe, 2015; Grim, et al., 2016). And inevitably this new reality carries with it many challenges at the security, cultural and political levels (Bricker & Ibbitson, 2019b; Grim, B., 2018a).

*The religious demographic reality still constitutes one of the most important pillars in understanding the political, security and cultural challenges that will face the European continent. Religious demography will reshape states and societies, and its role will emerge as a*

source of political legitimacy and political balance, as it presents a sense of identity and belonging. Not to mention that it is a tool of foreign policy and a frame of reference for the policies of many countries (Herrmann, 2022). In addition, the nature of global transformations (including security and military conflicts) has cultural roots, as religious dimensions are employed to achieve strategic interests and test balances of power (Wolff, 2021a).

Also, the extension of the religious demographic reality to the normative and value framework, which is linked to the system of values and the supreme interests of states. Therefore, the importance and role of the religious demographic dimension in consolidating the European cultural and political integration project cannot be overlooked, whether at the internal level of the continent or at the European global influence (Rabadi, 2022b).

## 6. Conclusion

Within the context of emphasizing future global demographic changes, there will inevitably be repercussions and impacts that will not only affect developing countries, but will also reach the European continent (Rabadi, 2022c). Since developing countries are now aging at a faster rate than European countries, the issues of demography, immigration, and aging will become one of the most important problematics that these countries will face in the near future (Herrmann, 2022). Here, many strategic question marks must be raised about the many European technocratic policies that have been adopted to address these challenges and problematics (Novotný, 2021).

In view of the importance of these problems and challenges for the European future, especially at the level of cultural security, specifically related to the repercussions of the religious demographic reality. Where, the importance of approaching the future dimensions of religious demography trends stems from the increasingly established belief that the 20th century was the century of secularism, and that the 21st century would be characterized by reverting to religion (Ward, 2019).

As it is expected that one of the salient signs of the global religious demographic growth (with the clear decline in the proportion of Christians in Europe) is the transfer of Christian religious weight from the European continent to the continent of Africa and Latin America (Mbiti, 2015). This will inevitably have negative connotations at the level of the normative value of the European continent with Christian roots (Cavallin, 2022; Encinas & Álvaro d'Ors, 2021; Sládek, 2019).

Ultimately, the leaders of the EU and European countries must know the importance of rapidly developing strategies and policies to confront and address future demographic risks characterized by complex, existential consequences and irreversible. Especially in regard to the cultural, security and political challenges of what has become called the "Emerging Immigration State" in the European continent (Stepka, 2022; Graef, 2022; Connelly, 2022).

Therefore, here we must raise many question marks about the extent to which European countries can adopt strategies that are able to face the economic, cultural and political challenges of all these transformations and the deep global demographic problematics in the future (Snel & Cremer, 2020; Formosa, 2019).

**Salam AL Rabadi.** *University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain.*

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science (Lebanon). Author and Researcher in International Relations. He is currently preparing a second doctoral thesis: *The Future of Europe and the Challenges of Demography and Migration*, University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain. Mail: jordani\_arabadi@hotmail.com

## References

- ADB: Asian Development Bank (2019). *Growing Old Before Becoming Rich: Challenges of An Aging Population in Sri Lanka. Philippines.* [https:// www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/557446/aging-population-sri-lanka.pdf](https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/557446/aging-population-sri-lanka.pdf)
- BACCI, L. M. (2017). *A Concise History of World Population.* John Wiley & Sons. pp.167-224.
- BERGANZA, J. C., CAMPOS, R. G., MARTÍNEZ, E., & PÉREZ, J. (2020). *The End Of The Demographic Dividend In Latin America: Challenges For Economic And Social Policies.* Banco de Espana Article. pp.1-6.
- BRICKER, D., & IBBITSON, J. (2019). *Empty Planet: The Shock Of Global Population Decline.* Crown, NY. pp.55-74.
- BRICKER, D., & IBBITSON, J. (2019a). *Empty Planet: The Shock Of Global Population Decline.* Crown, NY, pp.191-206.
- BRICKER, D., & IBBITSON, J. (2019b). *Empty Planet: The Shock Of Global Population Decline.* Crown, NY. pp. 105-124.
- BUSSOLO, M., KOETTL, J., SINNOTT, E. (2015). *Golden Aging: Prospects For Healthy, Active, And Prosperous Aging In Europe And Central Asia.* World Bank Publications. p.22.
- CAMPBELL, J., & PAGE, T. (2018). *Nigeria: What Everyone Needs To Know.* Oxford University Press, NY. pp.69-172.
- CARDONA, C., RUSATIRA, J. C., CHENG, X., SILBERG, C., SALAS, I., Li, Q., & RIMON, G.(2020). *Generating And Capitalizing On The Demographic Dividend Potential In Sub-Saharan Africa: A Conceptual Framework From A Systematic Literature Review.* International Journal of Social Welfare. Gates Open Research, 4. [https://gatesopenresearch.org/artic les4-145/v1](https://gatesopenresearch.org/articles/4-145/v1)
- CAVALLIN, C.(2022). *Useful Religion: The Future of Christianity In Europe.* European Conservative. Brussels. <https://europeanconservative.com/articles/essay/ useful-religion-the-future-of-christianity-in-europe/>
- CHAURASIA, A. R. (2020). *Population And Sustainable Development In India.* Springer. pp.1-10.
- CHEN, L. (2016). *Evolving Eldercare In Contemporary China: Two Generations, One Decision.* Palgrave Macmillan. U.K. pp.73-118.

- CILLUFFO, A. RUIZ, G. (2019). *World's Population Is Projected To Nearly Stop Growing By The End Of The Century*. Pew Research Center, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/worlds-population-is-projected-to-nearly-stop-growing-by-the-end-of-the-century/>
- CONNELLY, J. (2022). *From Peoples Into Nations: A History Of Eastern Europe*. Princeton University. U.S.A.pp.685-800
- CRISTEA, M., GEORGIANA, G., Dănaică, E., & ȘTEFEA, P. (2020). *Population Ageing, Labour Productivity And Economic Welfare In The European Union*. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja,33(1). pp. 1354-1376.
- DESA. (2019). *World Population Prospects 2019*. United Nations. NY. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/news/world-population-prospects-2019>.
- DESA: Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2015). *World Fertility Report 2015*. United Nations, NY. pp.6-9.
- DESA: Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2015a). *World Population Ageing 2015: Highlights*. United Nations. NY. pp. 1-3.
- DESA.(2019a). *World Population Prospects 2019*. United Nations. NY. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/news/world-population-prospects-2019>.
- DESA: Department of Economic and Social Affairs.(2019b). *World Population Prospects 2019*. United Nations. NY. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/news/world-population-prospects-2019-0>
- DESA: Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2019c). *World Population Prospects 2019*. United Nations. NY. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/news/world-population-prospects-2019-0>
- DESA: Department of Economic and Social Affairs.(2020).*World Population Ageing 2020 Highlights: Living Arrangements Of Older Persons*. United Nations. NY. p.1.
- DESA. (2021). *World Population Prospects 2021: Upgrade-Towards A More Open And Reproducible*. United Nations. NY. [https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org/development/desa/pd/files/undesa\\_pd\\_2021\\_egm\\_wpp2022\\_session\\_i\\_patrick\\_gerland.pdf](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org/development/desa/pd/files/undesa_pd_2021_egm_wpp2022_session_i_patrick_gerland.pdf)
- DESJARDINS, J. (2021). *The World Population Pyramid(1950-2100)*. Visual Capitalist. Our World in Data, Visual Capitalist.U.S.A, 21 Dec 2021. <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/the-world-population-pyramid-1950-2100/>.
- DESJARDINS, J. (2019). *The 8 Ways Urban Demographics Are Changing*. Visual Capitalist,U.S.A. <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/8-ways-urban-demographics-changing/>
- DG ECFIN. (2018). *Aging Report:Underlying Assumptions And Projection Methodologies*. Publications Office of the EU, Luxembourg. p.15.
- DG ECFIN. (2018a). *Aging Report:Underlying Assumptions And Projection Methodologies*. Publications Office of the EU, Luxembourg. pp.12-14.+28.
- DG ECFIN. (2018b). *The 2018 Ageing Report: Economic And Budgetary Projections For 28 EU Member States (2016-2070)*. Publications Office of the EU, Luxembourg. p.4.
- DG ECFIN. (2018c). *Underlying Assumptions & Projection Methodologies*. Publications

- Office of the EU, Luxembourg. pp. 21+24.
- DG ECFIN. (2018d). *The 2018 Ageing: Economic & Budgetary Projections For 28 EU Member States(2016-2070)*. European Commission. pp.27-29.
- DG ECFIN. (2018e). *The 2018 Ageing: Economic & Budgetary Projections For 28 EU Member States(2016-2070)*. European Commission. pp.27-29.
- DG ECFIN. (2018f). *Underlying Assumptions And Projection Methodologies*. Publications Office of the EU, Luxembourg.p.24.
- DoD:Department of Defense. *Beyond Demographics Is Destiny*. U.S. Military. pp.1-7.
- DOSSA P., COE C., DENEVA, N., ZHOU, R.,YARRIS,K. E., RAFFETY, L., KHAN, M., & Kobayashi, K. (2017). *Transnational Aging And Reconfigurations Of Kin Work*. Rutgers University Press. pp.43-119]
- DRAMANI, L. (2022). *Eight Demographic Trends Were Watching As The World Population Passes 8 Billion*.Population Reference Bureau(PRB) .U.S.A. [https:// www.prb.org/articles/eight-demographic-trends-were-watching-as-the-world-population-passes-8-billion/](https://www.prb.org/articles/eight-demographic-trends-were-watching-as-the-world-population-passes-8-billion/)
- DRAMANI, L., ZOUNGRANA, C., JALAL, H. (2023). *Empowering Women And Harnessing The Demographic Dividend: In Sub-Saharan Africa*. Our Knowledge Publishing. <https://www.amazon.com.br/Empowering-women-harnessing-demographic-dividend/dp/6206198340>
- EATOCK,D., MARGARAS,V.,ZAMFIR,L.,ORAV, A., (2019). *Demographic Outlook For The European Union,2019*. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). European Union. Brussels. p.3-5.
- EGGLESTON, K. (2017). *Policy Challenges From Demographic Change In China And India*. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. California. pp. (Chapter 1. Policy Challenges and Economic Impact).
- MORAN, E. (2017). *People And Nature: An Introduction To Human Ecological Relations*. Wiley-Blackwell ,U.K. , pp.145-165.
- ENCINAS, C., & Álvaro,C.(2021).*Europe's "Christian Roots" In The failed European Constitution Project*. Institute for Culture and Society(ICS).Spain.pp.3-12.
- ERTÜRK,O. & Karaçizmeli, A. (2022). *Aging And Age Discrimination In Europe: Understanding And Challenging Ageism*. Waxmann Verlag. NewYork. pp.7-9.
- ERTÜRK, O. & Oruç N. & Karaçizmeli, A. (2022a). *Aging And Age Discrimination In Europe: Understanding And Challenging Ageism*. Waxmann Verlag. NewYork. pp.7-9.
- EUROSTAT. (2017). *Median Age Ranges From 18 To 54 Across EU Regions*. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-2017-0215-1>
- EUROSTAT. (2019). *First Population Estimates EU*. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9967985/3-10072019-BP-EN.pdf/e152399bcb9e-4a42-a155-c5de6dfe25d1>
- EUROSTAT: General And Regional Statistics. (2019a). *The EU's Population Projected Up To 2100*. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20190710-1>
- EUROSTAT: General And Regional Statistics. (2019b). *The EU's Population Projected Up To 2100*. European Commission <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/>

DDN-20190710-1

- EUROSTAT: General And Regional Statistics.(2020).*Firstpopulation EU Population In 2020*. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/11081093/3-10072020-AP-EN.pdf/d2f799bf-4412-05cc-a357-7b49b93615f1>.
- EUROSTAT. (2021). *Life Expectancy Decreased In 2020 Across The EU*. European Commission.<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/edn-20210>
- EUROSTAT. (2021a). *Old-Age Dependency Ratio Increases Across EU Regions*. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/edn-20210930-1>
- EUROSTAT: General And Regional Statistics. (2023). *Mortality And Life Expectancy Statistics*. European Commission. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Mortalityandlifeexpectancy\\_statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Mortalityandlifeexpectancy_statistics).
- EUROSTAT. (2023a). *Life Expectancy By Age And Sex*. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/DEMOMLEXPECcustom5705197/default/table?lang=en&page=time:2021>
- EUROSTAT. (2023b). *Population Structure And Ageing*. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Populationstructureandageing>
- EUROSTAT: General And Regional. (2023c). *Population And Population Change Statistics*. European Commission. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population\\_and\\_populationchangestatistics#EUpopulationshows\\_a\\_strong\\_increase\\_in2022](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_and_populationchangestatistics#EUpopulationshows_a_strong_increase_in2022).
- EUROSTAT: General And Regional Statistics. (2023d). *Facts And Figures On Life In The European Union*. European Commission. <https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/key-facts-and-figures/life-euen>
- EUROSTAT. (2023e). *Infographic - Migration Flows: Eastern,Central And Western Routes*. European Commission. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/migration-flows-to-europe/>
- FAGBULE, F. & FAWEHINMI, F. (2021). *Formation: The Making Of Nigeria From Jihad To Amalgamation*.Cassava Republic Press. <https://cassavarepublic.biz/product/formations/>
- FAO: Food And Agriculture Organization(2018). *The State Of Food Security And Nutrition In The World 2018*. Rome. <http://www.fao.org/3/i9553en/i9553en.pdf>
- FORMOSA, M. (2019). *The University Of The Third Age And Active Ageing: European And Asian-Pacific Perspectives*. Springer, Switzerland. pp.1-142.
- GRAEF, J. (2022). *Imagining Far-Right Terrorism: Violence, Immigration, And The Nation State In Contemporary Western Europe*. Routledge. New York.pp.132-227.
- GRF Project. (2022). *Pew-Templeton: Global Religious Futures*. Pew Research Center. <http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org>
- GRIM, B., JOHNSON, T., SKIRBEKK,V., & ZURLO,G. (2016). *Yearbook Of International Religious Demography 2016*. Vol. 3. Brill. Netherlands. pp.83+107-128.
- GRIM,B.(2018).*Yearbook Of International Religious Demography 2018*. Vol. 5. Brill, Netherlands. pp.99–110.
- GRIM, B. (2018a). *Yearbook Of International Religious Demography*. Vol. 5. Brill, Netherlands. pp.99–110.



- HE, W., GOODKIND, D., & KOWAL, P. R. (2016). *An Aging World: 2015*. U.S. Census Bureau. pp11-12.
- HERRMANN, M.(2022).*The Global Population Will Soon Reach 8 Billion-Then What?*. United Nations Population Fund(UNFPA).NY. <https://www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/global-population-will-soon-reach-8-billion-then-what>
- ILO: International Labor Organization. (2013). *Employment And Social Protection In The New Demographic Context*. Geneva. pp.9-10.
- ILO: International Labour Organization. (2019). *World Employment And Social Outlook*. Geneva. [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms\\_670542.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_670542.pdf)
- JING, T. K., KUHNLE, S., PAN, Y., & CHEN, S. (2019). *Aging Welfare And Social Policy: China And The Nordic Countries In Comparative Perspective*. Vol.20. Berling/Heidelberg. Germany. Springer. pp. 139-238.
- JING, T. K., KUHNLE, S., PAN, Y., & CHEN, S. (Eds.). (2019a). *Aging And Social Policy: China And The Nordic Countries In Comparative Perspective*. Vol.20. Berling/ Heidelberg. Germany. Springer. pp. 233-237
- KISS, M., LAANINEN, T., MARGARAS, V., ZAMFIR, L., AUGÈRE, L., ATANASSOV, N. (2020). *Demographic Outlook For The EU2020*. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). Brussels. pp.25-50.
- LEWIS, I. M. (Ed.). (2018). *Islam In Tropical Africa*. (Vol. 4). Routledge. U.K. pp.32-44
- LUTZ, W., GOUJON, S., STONAWSKI, M., & STILIANAKIS, N. (2018). *Demographic And Human Capital Scenarios For The 21st Century: 2018 Assessment For 201 Countries*. Publications Office of the EU. pp.75-84.
- MAROIS,G., LUTZ,W.,BÉLANGER, A.(2020). *Population Aging, Migration, And Productivity In Europe*. National Academy of Sciences (PNAS).U.S.A.<https://www.pnas.org/content/117/14/7690>
- MARX, D.(2015). *Predictions For The 21st Century: A Reality Based Analysis Of The Current Global Population Collapse*. Create Space. Independent Publishing Platform. pp.15-35.
- MBITI, J. S. (2015). *Introduction To African Religion*. Waveland Press.U.S.A, pp. 194-205.
- MÜNZ, R. (2007). *Migration, Labor Markets, And Integration Of Migrants: An Overview For Europe*. Berlin-Institut. <https://www.berlin-institut.org/fileadmin/userupload/Preseschau/pdf/MuenzEurope.pdf>
- MURRAY, D. (2018). *The Strange Death Of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam*. Bloomsbury Publishing. pp.11-75.
- NEYER, G., ANDERSSON, G., & KULU, H. (2015). *The Demography Of Europe : Introduction*. Springer NY. pp.15-54+99-174
- NIA. National Institute on Aging.(2021). *Global Aging*. <https://www.nia.nih.gov/research/dbsr/global-aging> .
- NOVOTNÝ, V. (2021). *Future Of Europe: A Brussels-Based Dictatorship Or A Paradise Of Subsidiarity? National Prerogatives And EU Migration Policy*. Martens Centre for European Studies. Brussels. pp. 15-19.

- Offodile, C. (2016). *The Politics Of Biafra: And The future Of Nigeria*. Lulu. com. pp.169-188.]
- OGAWA, N., MANSOR, N., LEE, S. H., ABRIGO, M. R., & ARIS, T. (2021). *Population Aging And The Three Demographic Dividends In Asia*. Asian Development Bank , Philippines. pp.32-67.]
- PRB: Population Reference Bureau.(2017). *An African Demographic Dividend Relies On Investments In The Reproductive Health And Rights Of Adolescents And Youth*. <https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/02-2017-deomographic-Dividend -AU-Brief.pdf>
- PRB: Population References Bureau.(2019). *World Population Data Sheet 2018: Focus On Changing Age Structures*. <https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2018 /08/2018World-Population-data-sheet.pdf>
- PRB: Population References Bureau. (2019a). *World Population Data Sheet 2018: Focus On Changing Age Structures*. <https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2018 /08/2018 World-Population-data-sheet.pdf>
- RABADI S. A.(2022). *European Aging Dilemma And Political Problematic*. Tempo Exterior. n° 45.Vol. XXIII (II). Spain. pp 155-172.
- RABADI. S. A., (2022a). *Europa Y África: Demografía Religiosa Y Dimensiones Geopolíticas*. Anuario 2021. Centro De Estudios Internacionales Para El Esarrollo(CEID). Argentina. pp.88-92.
- RABADI, S. A. (2022b). *Europa Y África:Demografía Religiosa Y Dimensiones Geopolíticas*. Anuario 2021. Centro De Estudios Internacionales Para El Esarrollo(CEID). Argentina. pp.88-92.
- RABADI, S. A., (2022c). *European Aging Dilemma And Political Problematic*. Tempo Exterior. N° 45.Vol. XXIII (II).Spain. pp 155-172.
- RABADI, S., A. (2023). *Envejecimiento Europeo, Estado Del Bienestar Y Problemáticas Políticos futuros*. Anuario 2022. Centro De Estudios Internacionales Para El Esarrollo(CEID). Argentina. pp.84-90.
- RABADI, S., A. (2023a). *Envejecimiento Europeo, Estado Del Bienestar Y Problemáticas Políticos futuros*. Anuario 2022. Centro de Estudios Internacionales Para El Esarrollo(CEID). Argentina. pp.84-90
- RAHMAN, E. A., D'silva, E., & PETERANDERL,S. (Eds.).(2021).*The Demographic Dividend And The Power of Youth: Voices From The Global Diplomacy Lab*. Anthem Press. UK. pp.2-8.]
- RFE/RL's. (2021). *Turkmenistan Faces 'Shocking Population Decline' As Exodus Continues*. Turkmen Service. Prague. <https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-population-decline-exodus/31355045.html>
- ROSER, M., RITCHIE, H., ORTIZ, E., & RODÉS, L. (2019). *World Population Growth*. Our world in data. <https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth>
- ROSER, M., RITCHIE, H., ORTIZ, E., & RODÉS, L. (2019a). *World Population Growth*. <https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth>.]
- ROSS, A. (2019). *The City Of Tomorrow: Challenges And Innovation In The Urban Environment*.Wired. U.K. pp.13-52.
- SLÁDEK, K. (2019). *The Christian Roots Of European Identity. A Central European Pers-*

- pective. Pavel Mervart. Czech Republic.
- SMYTHE, K. R. (2015). *Africa's Past, Our Future*. Indiana University Press. pp. 155-224.
- SNEL, J., & CREMER, R. (Eds.). (2020). *Work And Aging: A European Prospective*. CRC Press. CRC Press. Florida.
- SOKOLOVSKY, J. (2020). *The Cultural Context Of Aging: Worldwide Perspectives*. 4th Edition. Praeger. p.31.
- SEWAMALA, F. M. (2015). *Optimizing The Demographic Dividend In Young Developing Countries: The Role Of Contractual Savings And Insurance For Financing Education*. International Journal Of Social Welfare. 24(3); U.S.A. pp. 248-262.
- STĘPKA, M. (2022). *Identifying Security Logics In The EU Policy Discourse: The "Migration Crisis" And The EU*. Springer. Switzerland. pp. 63-204.
- TRAORE, M. (2019). *Africa's Population Boom: Disaster Or Opportunity?*. European University Editions. Mauritius. p.162.
- UNDP: Development Programme. (2013). *The Rise Of The South: Human Progress In A Diverse World*. United Nations. Egypt. pp.101-102.
- UNDP. (2014). *Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities And Building Resilience*. United Nations. NY. pp. 61-62.
- UNDP: Development Programme. (2018). *Human Development Indices And Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update*. United Nations. NY. pp.46-49.
- UNDP: Development Programme. (2018a). *Human Development Indices And Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update*. United Nations. NY. pp.46-49.
- UNDP: Development Programme. (2018b). *Human Development Indices And Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update*. United Nations. NY. pp. 42.
- UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund. (2019). *Unfinished Business: The Pursuit Of Rights And Choices For All*. <https://www.unfpa.org/swop-2019>.
- UNFPA. (2023). *Eight Billion, Lives Infinite Possibilities: The Case For Rights And Choices*. State of World Population report. NY. <https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/swop23/SWOP2023-ENGLISH-230329-web.pdf>
- VOLLSET, E., GOREN, E., YUAN, W., CAO, J., SMITH, E., HSIAO, T., MURRAY, J. (2020). *Fertility, Mortality, Migration, And Population Scenarios For 195 Countries And Territories From 2017 To 2100: A Forecasting Analysis For The Global Burden Of Disease Study*. The Lancet, 396(10258), 1285-1306.
- WALKER, A. (Ed.). (2019). *The Future Of Ageing In Europe: Making An Asset Of Longevity*. Palgrave Macmillan. pp.1-52.
- WARD, K. (2019). *Religion In The Modern World: Celebrating Pluralism And Diversity*. Cambridge University. U.S. pp.200-204.
- WOLFF, S. (2021). *Secular Power Europe And Islam: Identity And Foreign Policy*. University of Michigan Press. U.S, 2021, pp.135-142.
- WOLFF, S. (2021a). *Secular Power Europe And Islam: Identity And Foreign Policy*. University of Michigan Press. U.S, 2021, pp.1-22+135-142.
- WORMALD, B. (2015). *The Future Of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050*. Pew Research Center, <https://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-pro->

jections-2010-2050/.

WORMALD, B. (2015). *The Future Of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050*. Pew Research Center. Washington, DC. <https://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/>.